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BEYOND AGREEMENT: 
Value Judgments in Conflict Resolution 
and 
Cooperative Conflict in the Classroom ' 
It was the moments of profound intellectual dissatisfaction from 
which I learned the most as a college student. I vividly remember, for 
example, listening to a presentation about family interaction during my 
senior year. It occurred to me that the instructor was saying nothing 
about how he thought a family ought to interact even though this 
normative vision clearly informed his descriptive model. When I asked a 
question about this, he smiled patiently and said he wanted to "avoid 
the whole value muddle." 
This response has stayed with me because it epitomizes what I have 
spent considerable time rebelling against. I am at work now on a book 
that will defend the enterprise of making value judgments. It will also 
insist, pace this instructor, that even if it were desirable to do so, 
avoiding the whole value muddle (WVM) simply cannot be done. One can 
only use the clever patter and gestures of a magician to distract an 
audience from the values that already have been chosen. It is possible, 
for example, to divert attention from the question of goals (where we're 
going and why) -- and toward the much safer question of technique (how 
we're getting there). This is often done by choosing a goal that seems 
so uncontroversial that one is scarcely aware a decision about values 
has been made. 
In political science, the most widely accepted good is the 
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stability of a society or government. "Stable" is used so often as an 
honorific, and "unstable" as an epithet, that few writers are impolite 
enough to ask how stability is achieved and maintained or who benefits 
from it. In psychiatry -- or that part of it shaped by the medical 
model -- the accepted good is the absence of dysfunction. Mental health . 
is implicitly defined as the state of being disease-free. In fact, a 
close inspection of this definition reveals it to be not merely 
insufficient (for leaving out any notion of positive health) but quite 
controversial indeed: it seems to classify as sick those people who risk 
sorrow in order to love, anxiety in order to creat9, inner turmoil in 
order to be morally responsible. 
I am arguing not merely that these values are dubious but that they . 
operate invisibly (for the most part) so their dubiousness, like their 
strength, is not questioned. By relying on a common-sense assumption 
that it is good to avoid political turmoil or psychological illness, we 
are invited to act accordingly without further discussion. We are 
asked, moreover, to pretend that the WVM has actually been avoided 
rather than simply driven underground. 
It seems to me that the same may be said of conflict resolution. 
My familiarity with the literature on this subject is limited, but my 
sense is that virtually everyone assumes that disputes are supposed to 
be settled to the satisfaction of both (or all) parties. When two 
people have different desires or demands, the idea is to devise a - 
solution to which both can agree. The goal is Yes; the only question is 
how to get there most expediently. 
My point is not to offer a sweeping challenge to the wisdom of this 
goal, but simply to argue that the goal reflects a value judgment -- as 
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surely as does, say, political stability. Furthermore, it is a judgment 
we ought to be prepared to defend rather than to take for granted. 
Consider another analogy: utilitarianism holds that acting morally 
simply means acting so as to bring about the greatest happiness or 
pleasure (or the least pain) for the greatest number of people. This 
principle is terribly appealing not merely because it offers itself as 
fully determinant -- that is, a solution to every possible ethical 
question -- but also because it eliminates moral ambiguity once and for 
all. A utilitarian can be stumped only because it's sometimes hard to 
know which option does bring about the most pleasure; this difficulty is 
a purely factual one. Thus even in moral theory it would seem 'possible 
to avoid the WVM. 
But along come the deontologists to upset the apple cart with their 
peculiar message -- peculiar, at least, to those in the English-speaking 
world -- that moral decisions must be based on more than thkir 
consequences. Results must be balanced against certain intrinsic rights 
or duties of the people involved. If a cost-benefit calculus showed a 
slave economy to provide more pleasure than pain overall, it would be, 
from the utilitarian perspective, not merely permissible but obligatory 
to bring back slavery. And yet slavery is intrinsically immoral on most 
deontological accounts. 
Without attempting to find an analogue for slavery, it seems clear 
that the teleological, "bottom-line" emphasis of utilitarianism is the 
- 
dominant force in conflict resolution. A negotiator who gets both 
disputants to sign off on an agreement goes home whistling. Yet what of 
cases in which one person capitulates because he or she lacks the 
resources or the stomach for further negotiation? The negotiator who 
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asks "Are you really happy with this?" -- a question that often seems 
morally appropriate -- does more than assume a practical risk of 
upsetting the "Yes." Such a negotiator calls into question the 
putatively value-free framework of such dispute resolution. Which of 
us, asked to shape a mutually acceptable compromise, would take at face 
value a weary comment such as, "I've had enough of this. Give him 
anything he wants"? Yet to question the motivation behind this decision 
is to agree in effect that "Yes" is not the last word. Like 
psychotherapists who embrace some notion of positive mental health -- 
something beyond the absence of illness -- negotiators who move beyond 
simple agreement of the disputing parties enter the realm of value 
judgment. More precisely, they find it harder to deny that they have 
inhabited this realm all along. 
Premature capitulation is only one circumstance that calls into 
question the common-sense goal of agreement. Consider a situation in 
which two parties agree at the expense of some other groups or 
individuals who are not part of the negotiations. (Management and 
union, for example, may decide on a two-tier wage package that harms 
only those people who have not yet been hired.) Or consider a scenario 
in which important questions are brushed aside so as not to threaten a 
negotiated agreement. (That nuclear weapons may be morally illegitimate 
and anti-democratic by their very existence are considerations unlikely 
to enter a negotiation on how many submarine-based warheads will be 
- 
permitted the two superpowers.) When a difficult dispute is broken down 
into a series of discrete issues to be addressed, it is particularly 
likely that broader questions -- particularly moral questions -- will be 
avoided altogether. 
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I do not want to be misunderstood. The exigencies of the situation 
sometimes demand that a limited agreement be hammered out right away. 
Satisfying all of the disputants, moreover, is normally an impressive 
accomplishment in itself and all that may be required. But what is 
"required" or desirable in any situation, exceptional or ordinary, is a 
function of a value judgment. It may be the case that the judgment 
enters the picture long before the negotiator does -- back at the stage 
when the dispute is being framed and decisions are made about who gets 
to decide. To some extent, this collapses into such macro- issues as 
the larger social interest in regulating private contracts. But 
regardless of who has made the decision and how and when, no one 
involved in conflict management should assume that the objective of 
getting two disputing people to agree is straightforward or value-free. 
The fact that the disputants themselves may be uninterested in such 
matters does not refute this point, but it does raise the questidn of 
how the negotiator or facilitator can justify reaching behind the 
disputants' utterances and beyond their stated goal. There is no pat 
answer here, just as there is none when the analogous 
who-are-you-to-judge challenge is put to the psychotherapist or the 
teacher, the journalist or the social scientist, who questions 
conventional goals and dares to expose himself or herself as a valuer. 
But let us at least be clear that concerning ourselves exclusively with 
technique does not mean that conflict resolution -- or any of these 
enterprises -- has been rendered value-free. It merely suggests that we 
are trying to duck the hard questions. 
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There is one arena in which agreement clearly is not -- or ought 
not to be -- the objective of a discussion among people who disagree. 
That arena is the classroom, where the goal is not concurrence but 
illumination, not "Yes" but "Aha!" 
Nevertheless, agreement on the part of students is demanded by some 
teachers. Others, meanwhile, transpose disagreement into debate. I 
want now to move to a brief consideration of these two models and to 
argue for a third alternative, which is to help students engage in 
cooperative conflict -- what educational psychologists David and Roger 
Johnson have called "friendly excursions into disequilibrium." 
My assumption here, of course, is that conflict does not entail 
competition. This view apparently is not shared by teachers who adopt 
either of the first two models. Some who are opposed to competition end 
up discarding conflict as well; they require consensus in all 
situations. Others, who value conflict, assume they must promote it in 
the context of competition. Both have failed in theory to distinguish 
between the two processes, and both are doing their students a 
disservice in practice. 
Consider first the teacher who artificially tries to suppress 
conflict by insisting that students reach agreement. I believe that 
genuine learning does not smooth over or soothe; it does not teach 
children that disagreement is illusory or bad. Thus I am impatient with 
exercises, such as those intended to "clarify" students' values, that 
require a group to reach a forced consensus. Anyone who has watched 
such groups in action has seen more bullying and coercion -- sometimes 
overt, sometimes subtle -- than authentic changes in position based on 
growth or persuasion. 
The Johnsons and their collaborators have shown in a series of 
studies that cooperative conflict is far superior to a forced consensus 
exercise, which they call "concurrence seeking." In one such study, 84 
sixth graders were placed in small groups in order to consider such 
issues as the advisability of strip mining. Some were told to produce 
group reports by compromising quickly and trying not to argue. Others 
were assigned particular positions on each topic and urged to disagree 
with each other in a cooperative atmosphere. The results were clear: 
those in the second condition learned the material more thoroughly and 
were better able to take the perspective of others. They also liked 
their classmates more and were more enthusiastic about this style of 
1 
learning. These findings have been replicated several times. Trying to 
reach agreement, then, is not a particularly useful model in the 
classroom. Students should be taught that people will not always see 
things the same way and that this is perfectly legitimate. 
But disagreement need not assume the form of debate. If there is - 
something worse than the absence of conflict, it is the presence of 
competition. Debates are justified as a way of educating students by 
I 
! 
i assigning them to argue for or against a controversial proposition. 
, 
i 
Specifically, the idea is to (1) force the participants to learn the 
subject thoroughly by thinking through the arguments and doing research 
to support their position; ( 2 )  teach the rest of the class by exposing 
them to the give and take of a debate; and ( 3 )  require participants to 
- 
, see both sides of a question by having them take part in "swing" 
debates, an exercise that has them arguing first on one side and then on 
---------- 
1. See my review of this literature in No Contest, pp. 155-57 
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the other. 
-Let us take each of these justifications in turn. First, I would 
contend that debates do not represent a constructive learning experience 
for participants. The learning that goes on is instead ~artial, skewed, 
distorted. It may be compared to the way an invader learns about a city 
he is about to attack -- or, better, the way a lawyer learns about a 
witness she is about to cross-examine. What a debater does is collect 
information for strategic purposes. What is not relevant for defending 
a position -- the historical context of an issue, for example -- is 
ignored. What is left is perceived from an adversarial perspective and 
then shaped into a n  argument rather than understood on its own terms. 
This is much worse than simply learning something half-way. 
Second, it is argued that debates are useful teaching tools for 
those who observe them. If both sides are skilled, a class will indeed 
learn the arguments' for and against some proposition. ~ u t  here are 
other, tacit lessons being taught in a debate. Students learn that 
there are two and only two sides to complex questions. In fact; there 
may be three or ten possible positions. Debates also socialize students 
to believe that the adversarial method is the best way of getting at the 
truth. In the last few years, a literature has begun to accumulate that 
casts doubt on this assumption. That justice is not really served by an 
adversarial legal system -- and that the deficiencies and excesses of 
American law can be traced back to its adversarial basis -- is the 
-L)  
L 
subject of a provocative book by Anne Strick and a somewhat tamer 
2. Anne Strick, Injustice for All, (New York: Penguin, 1978) 
3. Marvin Frankel, Partisan Justice, (New York: Hill and Wang; 1980) 
.. - 
..A 
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critique by Marvin Frankel . That the adversarial model may also not 
represent the best way to do philosophy -- in part because problems are 
selected in order to conform to this particular analytical technique -- 
is the thesis of a fascinating recent essay that deserves careful 
4 
attention. 
Finally, we may ask whether switching positions is a useful way for 
a debater to learn. If I may speak from personal experience here as a 
veteran of hundreds of high school debates in national interscholastic 
tournaments, arguing in favor of a proposition in one round and against 
it in the next actually promotes a kind of cynical relativism. No 
position is better than any other since any position can be successfully 
defended if one is clever enough. The emphasis is on tying logical 
knots, sounding persuasive, and even speaking so quickly that an 
opponent cannot respond to all your arguments. I remember one of my 
fellow debaters being genuinely perplexed when asked whether he 
personally supported a change in welfare policy (which was that year's 
national high school topic). "Well, that depends which side I'm on," he . 
said. 
Debate,. then, is neither an innocuous classroom game nor a salutary 
learning tool. On the other hand, we need not throw out the baby of 
conflict with the bathwater of competition. Disagreement can be handled 
constructively, which is to say cooperatively. When it is nestled in 
fellowship, so to speak, conflict is not threatening to children. It is 
- 
an effective way to learn about issues that may never be resolved and on 
4. Janice Moulton, "A Paradigm of Philosophy: The Adversary Method," in 
Sandra Harding and Merrill B. Hintikka, eds., Discovering Reality, 
(Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel, 19831, pp. 149-64 
which agreement is not really desirable. My larger point, however, 
concerns the "real world": I am suggesting that to press for resolution 
of a conflict is implicitly and inevitably to endorse a value judgment. 
It is a judgment, finally, that may be more problematic than we care to 
acknowledge. 
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stability of a society or government. "Stable" is used so often as an 
honorific, and "unstable" as an epithet, that few writers are impolite 
enough to ask how stability is achieved and maintained or who benefits 
from it. In psychiatry -- or that part of it shaped by the medical 
model -- the accepted good is the absence sf dysfunction. Mental health 
is implicitly defined as the state of being disease-free. In fact, a 
close inspection of this definition reveals it to be not merely 
insufficient (for leaving out any notion of positive health) but quite 
controversial indeed: it seems to classify as sick those people who risk 
sorrow in order to love, anxiety in order to create, inner turmoil in 
order to be morally responsible. 
I am arguing not merely that these values are dubious but that they . 
operate invisibly (for the most part) so their dubiousness, like their 
strength, is not questioned. By relying on a common-sense assumption 
that it is good to avoid political turmoil or psychological illness, we 
are invited to act accordingly without further discussion. We are 
asked, moreover, to pretend that the WVM has actually been avoided 
rather than simply driven underground. 
It seems to me that the same may be said of conflict resolution. 
My familiarity with the literature on this subject is limited, but my 
sense is that virtually everyone assumes that disputes are supposed to 
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- 
sdlution to which both can agree. The goal is Yes; the only question is 
how to get there most expediently. 
My point is not to offer a sweeping challenge to the wisdom of this 
goal, but simply to argue that the goal reflects a value judgment -- as 
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surely as does, say, political stability. Furthermore, it is a judgment 
we ought to be prepared to defend rather than to take for granted. 
Consider another analogy: utilitarianism holds that acting morally 
simply means acting so as to bring about the greatest happiness or 
pleasure (or the least pain) for the greatest number of people. This 
principle is terribly appealing not merely because it offers itself as 
fully determinant -- that is, a solution to every possible ethical 
question -- but also because it eliminates moral ambiguity once and for 
all. A utilitarian can be stumped only because it's sometimes hard to 
know which option does bring about the most pleasure; this difficulty is 
a purely factual one. Thus even in moral theory it would seem possible 
to avoid the WVM. 
But along come the deontologists to upset the apple cart with their 
peculiar message -- peculiar, at least, to those in the English-speaking 
world -- that moral decisions must be based on more than thkir 
consequences. Results must be balanced against certain intrinsic rights 
or duties of the people involved. If a cost-benefit calculus showed a 
slave economy to provide more pleasure than pain overall, it would be, 
from the utilitarian perspective, not merely permissible but obligatory' 
to bring back slavery. And yet slavery is intrinsically immoral on most 
deontological accounts, 
Without attempting to find an analogue for slavery, it seems clear 
that the teleological, "bottom-line" emphasis of utilitarianism is the - 
dominant force in conflict resolution, A negotiator who gets both 
disputants to sign off on an agreement goes home whistling. Yet what of 
cakes in which one person capitulates because he or she lacks the 
resources or the stomach for further negotiation? The negotiator who 
asks "Are you really happy with this?" -- a question that often seems 
morally appropriate -- does more than assume a practical risk of 
upsetting the "Yes." Such a negotiator calls into question the 
putatively value-free framework of such dispute resolution. Which of 
us, asked to shape a mutually acceptable compromise, would take at face 
value a weary comment such as, "I've had enough of this. Give him 
anything he wants"? Yet to question the motivation behind this decision 
is to agree in effect that "Yes" is not the last word. Like 
psychotherapists who embrace some notion of positive mental health -- 
something beyond the absence of illness -- negotiators who move beyond 
simple agreement of the disputing parties enter the realm of value 
judgment, More precisely, they find it harder to deny that they have 
inhabited this realm all along. 
Premature capitulation is only one circumstance that calls into 
question the common-sense goal of agreement. Consider a situation in 
which two parties agree at the expense of some other groups or 
individuals who are not part of the negotiations. (Management and 
union, for example, may decide on a two-tier wage package that harms 
only those people who have not yet been hired.) Or consider a scenario 
in which important questions are brushed aside so as not to threaten a 
negotiated agreement. (That nuclear weapons may be morally illegitimate 
and anti-democratic by their very existence are considerations unlikely 
to enter a negotiation on how many submarine-based warheads will be 
- 
permitted the two superpowers.) When a difficult dispute is broken down 
into a series of discrete issues to be addressed, it is particularly 
likely that broader questions -- particularly moral questions -- will be 
avoided altogether. 
I do not want to be misunderstood. The exigencies of the situation 
sometimes demand that a limited agreement be hammered out right away. 
Satisfying all of the disputants, moreover, is normally an impressive 
accomplishment in itself and all that may be required. But what is 
"required" or desirable in any situation, exceptional or ordinary, is a 
function of a value judgment. It may be the case that the judgment 
enters the picture long before the negotiator does -- back at the stage 
when the dispute is being framed and decisions are made about who gets 
to decide. To some extent, this collapses into such macro- issues as 
the larger social interest in regulating private contracts. But 
regardless of who has made the decision and how and when, no one 
involved in conflict management should assume that the objective of 
getting two disputing people to agree is straightforward or value-free. 
The fact that the disputants themselves may be uninterested in such 
matters does not refute this point, but it does raise the question of 
how the negotiator or facilitator can justify reaching behind the 
disputants' utterances and beyond their stated goal. There is no pat 
answer here, just as there is none when the analogous 
who-are-you-to-judge challenge is put to the psychotherapist or the 
teacher, the journalist or the social scientist, who questions 
conventional goals and dares to expose himself or herself as a valuer. 
But let us at least be clear that concerning ourselves exclusively with 
technique does not mean that conflict resolution -- or any of these 
- - 
enterprises -- has been rendered value-free. It merely suggests that we 
are trying to duck the hard questions. 
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There is one arena in which agreement clearly is not -- or ought 
not to be -- the objective of a discussion among people who disagree. 
That arena is the classroom, where the goal is not concurrence but 
illumination, not "Yes" but "Aha!" 
Nevertheless, agreement on the part of students is demanded by some 
teachers. Others, meanwhile, transpose disagreement into debate. I 
want now to move to a brief consideration of these two models and to 
argue for a third alternative, which is to help students engage in 
cooperative conflict -- what educational psychologists p avid and Roger 
Johnson have called "friendly excursions into disequilibrium." 
My assumption here, of course, is that conflict does not entail 
competition. This view apparently is not shared by teachers who adopt 
either of the first two models. Some who are opposed to competition end 
up discarding conflict as well; they require consensus in all 
situations. Others. who value conflict, assume they must promote it in 
the context of competition. Both have failed in theory to distinguish 
between the two processes, and both are doing their students a 
disservice in practice. 
Consider first the teacher who artificially tries to suppress 
conflict by insisting that students reach agreement. I believe that 
genuine learning does not smooth over or soothe; it does not teach 
children that disagreement is illusory or bad. Thus I am impatient with 
exercises, such as those intended to "clarify" students' values. that 
- - 
require a group to reach a forced consensus. Anyone who has watched 
such groups in action has seen more bullying and coercion -- sometimes 
overt, sometimes subtle -- than authentic changes in position based on 
growth or persuasion. 
The Johnsons and their collaborators have shown in a series of 
studies that cooperative conflict is far superior to a forced consensus 
exercise, which they call "concurrence seeking." In one such study, 84 
sixth graders were placed in small groups in order to consider such 
issues as the advisability of strip mining. Some were told to produce 
group reports by compromising quickly and trying not to argue. Others 
were assigned particular positions on each topic and urged to disagree 
with each other in a cooperative atmosphere. The results were clear: 
those in the second condition learned the material more thoroughly and 
were better able to take the perspective of others. They also liked 
their classmates more and were more enthusiastic about this style of 
1 
learning. These findings have been replicated several times. Trying to 
reach agreement, then, is not a particularly useful model in the 
classroom. Students should be taught that people will not always see 
things the same way and that this is perfectly legitimate, 
But disagreement need not assume the form of debate. If there is 
something worse than the absence of conflict, it is the presence of 
competition. Debates are justified as a way of educating students by 
assigning them to argue for or against a controversial proposition. 
Specifically, the idea is to (1) force the participants to learn the 
subject thoroughly by thinking through the arguments and doing research 
to support their position; (2) teach the rest of the class by exposing 
them to the give and take of a debate; and ( 3 )  require participants to 
- 
see both sides of a question by having them take part in "swing" 
debates, an exercise that has them arguing first on one side and then on 
---------- 
I. See my review of this literature in No Contest, pp. 155-57 
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the other. 
Let us take each of these justifications in turn. First, I would 
contend that debates do not represent alconstructive learning experience 
for participants. The learning that goes on is instead partial, skewed, 
distorted. It may be compared to the way an invader learns about a city 
he is about to attack -- or, better, the way a lawyer learns about a 
witness she is about to cross-examine. What a debater does is collect 
information for strategic purposes. What is not relevant for defending 
a position -- the historical context of an issue, for example -- is 
ignored. What is left is perceived from an adversarial perspective and 
then shaped into an argument rather than understood on its own terms. 
This is much worse than simply learning something half-way. 
Second, it is argued that debates are useful teaching tools for 
those who observe them. If both sides are skilled, a class will indeed 
learn the arguments for and against some proposition. ~ u t  here are 
other, tacit lessons being taught in a debate. Students learn that 
there are two and only two sides to complex questions. In fact, there 
may be three or ten possible positions, Debates also socialize students 
to believe that the adversarial method is the best way of getting at the 
truth. In the last few years, a literature has begun to accumulate that 
casts doubt on this assumption, That justice is not really served by an 
adversarial legal system -- and that the deficiencies and excesses of 
American law can be traced back to its adversarial basis -- is the - - 2 
subject of a provocative book by Anne Strick and a somewhat tamer 
2 ,  Anne-Strick, Injustice for All, (New York: Penguin, 1978) 
3. Marvin Frankel, Partisan Justice, {New York: Hill and Wang,* 1980) 
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critique By Marvin Frankel . That the adversarial model may also not 
represent the best way to do philosophy -- in part because problems are 
selected in order to conform to this particular analytical technique -- 
is the thesis of a fascinating recent essay that deserves careful 
4 
attention. 
Finally, we may ask whether switching positions is a useful way for 
a debater to learn. If I may speak from personal experience here as a 
veteran of hundreds of high school debates in national interscholastic 
tournaments, arguing in favor of a proposition in one round and against 
it in the next actually promotes a kind of cynical relativism. No 
position is better than any other since any position can be successfully 
defended if one is clever enough, The emphasis is on tying logical 
knots, sounding persuasive, and even speaking so quickly that an 
opponent cannot respond to all your arguments. I remember one of my 
fellow debaters being genuinely perplexed when asked whether he 
personally supported a change in welfare policy (which was that year's 
national high school topic). "Well, that depends which side I'm on," he 
said. 
Debate, then, is neither an innocuous classroom game nor a salutary 
learning tool. On the other hand, we need not throw out the baby of 
conflict with the bathwater of competition. Disagreement can be handled 
constructively, which is to say cooperatively, When it is nestled in 
fellowship, so to speak, conflict is not threatening to children, It is - 
an effective way to learn about issues that may never be resolved and on 
4. Jankce Moulton, "A Paradigm of Philosophy: The Adversary Method," in 
Sandra Harding and Merrill B. Hintikka, eds., Discovering Reality, 
(Dsrdrecht, Holland: D, Reidel, 19831, pp. 149-64 
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which agreement is not really desirable. My larger point, however, 
concerns the "real world": I am suggesting that to press for resolution 
of a conflict is implicitly and inevitably to endorse a value judgment. 
It 4s a judgment, finally, that may be more problematic than we care to 
acknowledge. 
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